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Abstract
The housing prices in Norway and the ratio of Norwegian household
debt to disposable income have reached unprecedentedly high levels
in recent years, raising concerns about whether we are in a serious
housing bubble. This attracts much attention and initiates debates
among politicians, researchers as well as the entire society. Contribut-
ing to the debates, the present thesis studies “cash-out” refinancing
in the Norwegian housing market and has two main findings. First,
along with the soaring housing prices in the past ten years, mortgage
borrowers significantly extended their debt levels through home equity-
based refinancing. This “cash-out” effect substantially contributed to
the high ratio of Norwegian household debt to disposable income. Sec-
ond, borrowers with larger “cash-out” refinancing are more likely to
face payment difficulties with unexpected expenditures, indicating a
potential coming danger in the Norwegian housing market. As “cash-
out” refinancing is blamed to be one of the key drivers of the subprime
crisis in the United States (Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, 2011 AER), our
findings call for more regulations in the Norwegian mortgage market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The debt of Norwegian households has reached a unprecedentedly high
level, and has increased more than the income in the latest years. By
the end of 2013, Norwegian households had a debt to income ratio1 of
210 percent (The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2013).
In the US, the debt to income ratio has never exceeded 130 percent,
even at its peak in 2007, which was followed by the financial crisis.
Figure 1.1: Ratio of Household Debt to Disposable Income
Sources: Norges Bank and FRB St. Louis
Prior to the crisis, mortgage credit became more easily available for
1Debt as proportion of disposable income
1
2new home buyers, which contributed to the rapid increase in US-
household leverage between 2002-2006 (Mian and Sufi, 2009). In Nor-
way, regulations and capital requirements by the authorities are set to
prevent the banks to undertake a lot of risky mortgages. New home
buyers need at least 15 percent equity to get mortgage credit (Norges
Bank, 2013).
Recent research by Mian and Sufi (2011) finds that a significant part of
the US leverage crisis, was driven by existing home-owners borrowing
heavily against rising home value. This finding provides motivation to
apply this line of research in the Norwegian housing market.
Our main goal in this study is to estimate how Norwegian home-owners
“cash-out” home-equity as a response to increased home value. Using
cross sectional survey data consisting of anonymous households housing
and credit conditions, we examine this home-equity based borrowing
channel, also referred to as the “cash-out” effect. The survey of living
conditions is conducted annually by Statistics Norway, with a rotating
module. The module of housing conditions were carried out in 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2012. The survey data includes a total of 10 433 owner
households.
First, we present a model in order to measure if home-owners extract
home-equity based on their self-predicted home value. Controlling for
household characteristics, we find that a one percent increase in pre-
dicted selling price is associated with 0.55 percent “cash-out” of home-
equity, or borrowing of 55 NOK for every 100 NOK gain in home equity.
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Next, we seek to answer whether the the rapid growth in the housing
market amplify the “cash-out” effect for Norwegian home-owners. By
including time dummies and interaction terms, we examine whether
the “cash-out” effect differs across time. Our findings suggest that
home-owners respond more aggressively to a change in predicted sell-
ing price in 2012, compared to 2001. Furthermore, we identify which
home-owners that “cash-out” most aggressively. By studying the cross
sectional heterogeneity among home-owners, we find that the extrac-
tion of home-equity is not uniform across household characteristics.
Economists Paul Krugman, Vernon Smith and Robert Shiller, have
all warned about a Norwegian housing bubble. Krugman’s warnings
are based on the strong and continuous growth in Norwegian house
prices in addition to the high debt to income ratio. Smith points out
the rapid growth in house prices, compared to the growth in inflation
and income as a sign of a bubble. Shiller’s concerns are based on pos-
sible psychological factors among Norwegians, and argues that the oil
industry and low unemployment rate may be a feeling of national suc-
cess. In other words, we have three Nobel Prize winners pointing out
the same; the Norwegian housing market looks like a bubble (Dagens
Næringsliv, 2014, 8th of January; Langberg, 2013; Ellyatt, 2012).
Paul Krugman’s concerns about the Norwegian housing market got
some unexpected attention from the prime minister of Norway, Erna
Solberg. In January 2014, she rejected a housing bubble in Norway
and stated:
4“Often I find foreign economists, with an American view,
have a different frame of reference when analyzing the Nor-
wegian economy”
Source: Dagens Næringsliv, 8th of January, 2014
Krugman, however, interpreted this as an even stronger sign of a bub-
ble, and provocative enough replied:
“When politicians says that everything is OK, its a sign of
a bubble”
Source: Dagens Næringsliv, 8th of January, 2014
The credit default rate on Norwegian households fell after the banking
crisis in the 1990s, and has been low and stable since 2000 (Solheim
and Vatne, 2013). At the same time, the debt to income ratio has
never been higher (Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013). The rel-
atively small share of credit defaults could be explained by certain
credit regulations. In Norway, there is full recourse borrowing, mean-
ing the credit do not follow the house but the individual. As for the
lenders, securitization of mortgages are strictly regulated (NOU, 2011).
Despite the existence of “cash-out” in the Norwegian housing market,
the authorities reject the existence of a bubble. In our final analysis we
use a logistic model to identify how the probability of facing payment
difficulties is related to the “cash-out” refinancing. Our model suggest
a 50 percent higher odds of having payment difficulties for households
with a mortgage that exceeds the initial house price.
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We do not attempt to confirm bubble speculations, nor predict a fi-
nancial crisis. Our contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the
Norwegian housing market is to explore the “cash-out” effect, and to
determine whether or not the “cash-out” effect is sustainable for the
household economy.
To achieve the goals mentioned, first a brief look into theoretical back-
ground and literature will be covered in chapter 2. Research question
and hypotheses will be presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 features
descriptive statistics and describes the underlying methodology. Sub-
sequently, chapter 5 covers the empirical analysis and the test results.
Having carried out the results, chapter 6 then features a discussion of
the most interesting findings and results. Finally, chapter 7 concludes
the thesis with a brief summary.

Chapter 2
Background and the Literature
2.1 Regulatory Differences Between
Housing Markets in Norway and the
US
The last thirty years the financial system has undergone a revolution-
ary change. The technical change has reduced transaction costs while
commercial and academic development has led to a widely use of port-
folio optimization, securitization and credit scores. The deregulation
has removed barriers which prevents entries and competition between
institutions, markets and products. Last, the institutional change has
provided new entities within the financial system, such as private eq-
uity firms and hedge funds. As a result the financial markets have
expanded and become deeper, and hence allowed the risk to be more
widely spread throughout the economy (Rajan, 2005).
The purpose of securitization is converting illiquid assets into liquid se-
curities. This process allows the lenders to structure financial products
like collateralized debt obligation (CDO) and mortgage-backed securi-
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ties (MBS) (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2010). As pointed out by Keys
et al. (2010), the securitization practices did affect screening incentives
of US lenders prior to the subprime crisis. CDOs and MBSs offered
high return, due to higher interest rates on mortgages. The risk level
was considered low as the credit agencies provided the lenders with
high credit scores (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2010).
Prior to the US subprime crisis in 2007, the US leverage sharply in-
creased. From 2002 to 2007, US households doubled their debt balance.
Debelle (2004) points out that much of the increase in household lever-
age can be attributed to two factors, which is the deregulation in the
early 1980s and the reduction of interest rates. Combined, these factors
commonly reduce the credit constraints on households. It seems to be
widely agreed that introducing easy available mortgage credit to risky
new home buyers, was unsustainable (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Anund-
sen and Jansen, 2011). Other countries, including Norway, with more
stable credit conditions have been relatively shielded from the current
crisis. The main effect was through international financial leakages, as
Norwegian banks had a small exposure to US subprime loans. Norwe-
gian manufacturers produced consumer durables to a very small extent,
which were the products exposed to the greatest decline in demand in-
ternationally. Furthermore, the demand from the oil sector remained
high. The financial solidity of Norway gave the authorities high flex-
ibility in economic policy compared with many other countries. The
losses on loans for the financial sector were modest, hence the finan-
cial crisis was not a solvency crisis for Norwegian banks (NOU, 2011).
Norwegian households have a high leverage rate compared with other
countries. 80 percent of Norwegians own their home, a share that
9 Chapter 2. Background and the Literature
has been stable for the last decades (Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen,
2013). Furthermore, the majority of households hold floating interest
rate mortgages. When the financial crisis reached Norway, the expan-
sionary monetary policy had a fast and powerful impact on households
income and thus their demand (NOU, 2011).
Norwegian fiscal institutions are subject to regulations which in certain
areas are stricter than the requirements in the European Union. A low
percentage of mortgage defaults may be contributed to some of these
regulations. The process of mortgage securitization is strictly regu-
lated. Mortgages are full recourse, hence home-owners have a strong
incentive to avoid default (NOU, 2011). In 1992 the Debt Settlement
Act (DSA) was introduced in Norway. The arrangement involves set-
ting up a plan for the debtor’s income and expenses for the next five
years. If the person lives simply and follows the determined plan, the
debt is partially, or completely, cleared by the end of the five-year pe-
riod. The intention of the DSA is to ensure that the borrower fulfils
its obligations as far as possible, and that there is an organized distri-
bution of the debtor’s assets among creditors (Kommunal- og region-
aldepartementet, 2004). A full recourse mortgage exposes the lenders
for less risk, since the mortgage follows the borrower and not the real
estate (International Monetary Fund, 2012). This is contrary to some
states in the US, where the borrower has limited liability. Hence, a
decrease in house prices would affect the lender to a greater extent in
the United States as home-owners simply could choose to walk away
from their homes to cover their mortgages (NOU, 2011).
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2.2 Aggregate House Prices and Aggre-
gate Consumption
There is a strong correlation between aggregate house prices and aggre-
gate consumption (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2003). Defining wealth
as the sum of liquid financial assets and property minus outstanding
debt, implies that an increase in house prices leads to an increase in
households financial wealth. The underlying model of consumer be-
haviour depends on whether or not this contribution can affect the
housing wealth. Standard economic theory suggests utility maximiz-
ing households with rational and forward looking behaviour. House-
holds decide how much to consume in this period, and how much to
invest/save for future consumption (Varian, 1992). As pointed out by
Sinai and Souleles (2005), an increase in home value compensates for
an implicit higher rental cost. In other words, home-owners are hedged
against fluctuations in spot housing costs. Houses pay out dividends
equal to the ex post spot rent, and therefore a hedge against rent risk
is provided. With increasing house prices, renters would experience an
increase in their future rent “liabilities”. On the other hand, home-
owners would experience a corresponding increase in home value, and
therefore an implicit dividend increase. These factors reduce the over-
all wealth effect from increased house prices, and should not affect
consumption choices. In other words, the propensity to “cash-out”
home equity is zero.
Young home-owners are expected to increase the size of their home
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later in life, and can be thought of as “short” in the housing mar-
ket. Older home-owners are on the other hand expected to move to
smaller homes, hence they are “long” in the housing market. With-
out financial instruments to hedge these positions, house price growth
is expected to affect the consumption of these two groups differently.
Young households are expected to cut their consumption with rising
house prices, while older households are expected to increase their con-
sumption (Campbell and Cocco, 2007).
A second explanation of the correlation between consumption and
house prices is credit constrained home-owners. Homes are used as
collateral in a mortgage. An increase in home value allows borrowing
constrained households to smooth their consumption path over time,
by “cashing-out” home equity (Lustig and Nieuwerburgh, 2006).
Another consumption model is based on short-lived home-owners. This
is households that do not value housing bequests high, and that pre-
fer to spend their capital before they pass. These home-owners would
“cash-out” home equity with increasing home value to finance con-
sumption. The propensity to borrow would then be stronger for home-
owners with a shorter life-horizon (Mian and Sufi, 2011).
From 2005 to 2010, TNS Gallup, on Finanstilsynet’s behalf, conducted
a survey of a random sample of borrowers that have taken out a mort-
gage secured on a dwelling over the past year. The results of the survey
are presented in figure 2.1. In 2010, only a modest proportion of new
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Figure 2.1: Purpose of Loan, ordinary repayment loans secured on
dwellings
Source: The financial supervisory authority of Norway/Finanstilsynet
issued loans were used to housing investments1. About 50 percent of
new issued loans were used for home improvement, purchase of a car,
boat or cabin, consumption and repayment of other debt (The Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2011).
2.3 Expectations and Housing Prices
Behavioural economics and psychology are important to understand
and predict households economic behaviour. In theory there are two
types of investors, rational and irrational. Rational investors trade on
1Participants where able to report more than one purpose per loan
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fundamental values, while irrational investors operate independently
on fundamental values and might value an asset on the basis of his-
torical returns or technical analysis. An argument supporting the ef-
ficient market hypothesis, is that irrational investors trade randomly,
and hence cancel each other out. Psychological research suggests that
noise traders do not trade randomly, but deviate in the same direction.
In other words, irrational investors buy the same securities and sell the
same securities roughly at the same time (Shleifer, 2000).
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2003) finds that home-buyer’s expectations
are significantly affected by previous experience. Using US survey data,
they find that home buyers who previous have experienced a rapid
growth in house prices, typically expect an annual growth of double-
digit numbers. This implies a tripling or quadrupling of home value
for the next decade. At the same time, these home-buyers expect a
low risk level. Previous work of Case and Shiller (1988) also suggests
that home-buyers in cities where house prices have risen rapidly in the
past, expect much higher future growth compared to home buyers in
cities where house prices have been stagnant or declining.
Anundsen and Jansen (2011) finds that household’s future expecta-
tions about their private economy and the Norwegian macro economy
lead to an immediate increase in the house price growth. If the con-
sumer confidence index, illustrated in figure 2.2, rises by one index
point, the immediate effect on house price growth would be 0.1 per-
centage points. The cumulative increase in house prices would be 0.25
percentage points.
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Source: Finans Norge
Figure 2.2: Survey of Expectations, 1992-2014. Norwegian households
expectations concerning future development in their private economy
and the macro economy, quarterly 1992-2014. The index is developed
by TNS Gallup and Finans Norge. The indicator measures the differ-
ence between the percentage proportion of optimistic and pessimistic
answers for each question, divided by 5. The survey questions are listed
in appendix A
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2.4 Self-reinforcing Effects Between Hous-
ing Prices and Debt
Falling house prices have preceded financial crises in the past2 (Hilbers,
Lei, and Lisbeth, 2001). Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) argues that de-
viations from the long run equilibrium occur more frequently in the real
estate market compared to the financial market. This is thought to be
because of the rigid supply and market imperfections. Increased house
prices lead to higher demand for credit in order to finance a house
purchase. As most mortgages have the property itself as collateral,
and with rising house prices the value of the collateral also increases.
More collateral leads to higher borrowing capacity for the home-owner.
Property prices affect the value of the bank, since the probability of
default reduces with higher value of the collateral on existing mort-
gages. This may stimulate the lending capacity for the banks, since
the willingness to extend loans increases with the risk capacity of the
bank. Since most property purchases are financed with credit, changes
in household mortgages are expected to affect housing prices. The find-
ings of Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) suggest that deviation of house
prices from their fundamental value contributes to bank distress.
Anundsen and Jansen (2011) identifies the self-reinforcing effects be-
tween housing prices and debt. They find that real housing prices are
affected by real debt, disposable income and home credit. Furthermore,
2For example, Netherlands (early 1980’s) and Scandinavia (late 1980’s), Japan
(early 1990’s)
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the real debt depends on the real value of their property, real interest
rate after tax and housing turnover. Their model shows that debt gives
a direct effect on house prices in the short run, but the house prices
only affect debt through the error-correction term. Further, they pro-
vide clear evidence of a financial accelerator in Norway. An exogenous
shock in the credit aggregate changes the house price growth, which in
turn changes the credit growth due to collateral effects. This, in turn,
drives the house price growth further, and so on.
Chapter 3
Research Question
3.1 Motivation
The findings of Mian and Sufi (2009) suggest that the sharp increase
in US household leverage from 2002 to 2006, was a primary trigger
of the recent financial crisis. They point out that the rapid leverage
growth can be contributed to the weakening of the US credit standards.
As the standards were weakened, mortgage credit became more easily
available for new home buyers. Furthermore, in Mian and Sufi (2011)
they provide evidence that the credit availability also had an important
feedback through existing home-owners. Using individual credit files
they follow a panel of 74 000 US home-owners at an annual frequency
from 1997 to 2008. By using two types of instrument variables for the
house price growth, they find a strong link between house prices and
household borrowing. In addition, they suggest that the extraction of
home-equity concentrates largely among young home-owners with high
credit card utilization or low credit score. Their findings also indicate
that the extraction of home-equity is primarily used for consumption
or home-improvement.
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However, the most interesting finding in their paper is the relation be-
tween home-equity extraction and the default rate. By estimating the
default rate implications of home-equity extraction, they found that
39 percent of US defaults can be attributed to existing home-owners.
This implicates that the US-default crisis was not entirely driven by
new home-buyers, but also through the “cash-out” refinancing of ex-
citing home-owners.
As of the current Norwegian credit standards, subprime lending is not
an issue for the Norwegian banks. However, the evidence provided by
Mian and Sufi (2011) gives strong motivation for researching whether
or not it is possible to find a “cash-out” tendency among Norwegian
households.
3.2 The Norwegian Housing and Credit
Market
In the 1970s the Norwegian credit market was strict, and the authori-
ties had a wide range of instruments to keep the credit growth under
control (Krogh, 2010).
The strict regulations in the 1970s were followed by a gradual deregula-
tion in the 1980s. In 1980 the interest rate norms set by the government
were given less strict formulation, before it was abandoned in 1985 and
interest rates were allowed to float freely. The liberalization process in
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the 1980s lead to a sharp increase in household leverage and boomed
the real estate market, illustrated in figure 3.1. The stock market col-
lapse in October 1987 and an increase in credit defaults, were the first
signs of weaknesses in the banking sector. In the following years, losses
on loans increased. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Norwegian econ-
omy experienced a national banking crisis, and a sharp drop in house
prices (Krogh, 2010). This was a development fulfilling the character-
istics of a boom-bust economy (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2004).
Figure 3.1: Real House Price Index
Sources: Shiller (2005) and Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004, 2005)
In 1992 the unemployment rate peaked at 6 % accompanied by a lend-
ing rate of 13 %. Despite this, only 1033 houses were enforced sold (As-
trup and Aarland, 2013). In 1992-1993 the house price index started
to increase and the banks started to improve. In 1996 new require-
ments were introduced to limit the market risk. The housing market
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continued to increase and so did the demand for credit. In 1998 regu-
lations by the authorities were implemented to increase the risk weight
1 for mortgages with a high loan to value (LTV) 2. As a result, the
demand for credit was somewhat damped (Krogh, 2010; Jansen and
Krogh, 2011).
In 2001 the regulation in 1998 was reversed, as this change in the risk
weights of the banks were meant to be temporary. Mid 2000s “flexible
mortgages” became more available and popular. Compared to a tra-
ditional mortgage, these loans provide a flexible credit line, where the
home-owners are free to choose how much they want to use of a given
mortgage constraint. As these loans became more available, housing
wealth became much more liquid. In 2007 Basel II3 were implemented
(Krogh, 2010). In this context, the most important change was that the
risk weight on mortgages was reduced 4. Throughout 2007, 41 percent
of existing home-owners increased their mortgage (Vatne, 2009). As
the US subprime crisis became global, the Norwegian housing market
fell in the first half of 2008. The international setback and uncertainty
contributed to a reinforcing decrease. The housing market stabilized
in 2009, and the boom continued. This was contrary to many OECD-
countries which experienced a reversal after the previous appreciation.
The increase in industrial activity and the low unemployment rate may
have contributed to the growth in the Norwegian housing market af-
1An increase from 50% to 100%
2Mortgages with LTV between 60% and 80%
3A set of international banking regulations put forth by the Basel Committee
on Bank Supervision
4LTV below 80% were given risk weight of 35 %, LTV above 80% were given a
risk weight of 75%
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ter the crisis (Finansdepartementet, 2013). In 2010 requirements of 10
percent equity to obtain a mortgage secured on dwelling, were imple-
mented. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway’s, concerns
about the financial stability, lead to a further increase in the equity
requirements in 2012. 15 percent equity was implemented to ensure a
prudent lending practise, in order to reduce the risk in the household
sector as well as the solidity of the banks (Norges Bank, 2013).
Excluding 2009, the debt to disposable income ratio has increased
over the last 15 years (The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway,
2013). However, the increased household leverage has not affected the
credit default rate. After the crisis in 1990, the credit default rate
decreased, and has been low and stable since 2000 (NOU, 2011). In
February 2014, The Norwegian Minister of Finance, Siv Jensen, argued
in her speech on the Eff-day5 that the credit regulations and increasing
house prices have made it more difficult for “ordinary” people to get
mortgage approval. Jensen has repeatedly given the impression that
she wants more flexible practise of the 15 percent equity requirement.
3.3 Hypothesis
The objective of the analysis conducted in the present thesis is to de-
termine if existing home-owners in Norway extract home-equity based
on self-predicted home value.
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The findings of Mian and Sufi, 2011 showed that the weakening of
the US credit standards also had an important feedback through ex-
isting home-owners. The credit standards in Norway are supposed to
ensure sustainability for the household economy as well as the banking
sector (Norges Bank, 2013). Our focus will be whether or not the find-
ings of Mian and Sufi, 2011 can be related to the Norwegian economy.
Further, we consider whether these findings call for more regulation in
the Norwegian mortgage market.
Hypothesis I:The “cash-out” effect is positive and significant for Nor-
wegian households.
In Norway, increased house prices have been accompanied with in-
creased household debt. This motivates for the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis II:The “cash-out” effect is increasing and changes sig-
nificantly over time in Norway.
Further, to investigate which home-owners that respond most aggres-
sively to increased predicted selling price, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis III:“The cash-out” effect is heterogeneous across Nor-
wegian home-owners.
Finally, the leverage growth in Norway is assumed to be sustainable
due to credit regulations. This motivates for the fourth hypothesis.
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Hypothesis IV:The Norwegian household economy is sustainable de-
spite the existence of the “cash-out” effect.

Chapter 4
Data and Methodology
4.1 Data Material
In the present analysis, we use household level data from the Survey
of Living Conditions. SSB, Division for Social Welfare Statistics is re-
sponsible for the surveys. The survey is carried out annually with a
set of rotating topics. Housing conditions were the topic in 1997, 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2012. SSB collects the data mainly through telephone
interviews, and in some cases personal interviews. The sample of the
survey contains a rotating panel. This means that the same individuals
are interviewed several years, in addition to new participants. Addi-
tional assessment data is connected to the surveys after the interview
process. NSD anonymize the data files and make them available for
researchers and students. Due to national regulations about privacy
and anonymity the panel can not be connected. In the survey of 1997
one of the key variables chosen for this thesis was omitted, hence the
surveys used in the present analysis is from 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2012
(Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013).
In 2011 the survey was coordinated with Eurostats Survey on In-
25
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come and Living Conditions, EU-SILC. This implementation makes
it possible to compare the living conditions across European countries
(Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013). As a result, the sample size
has increased, and is twice as large as the previous years. However,
the response rate of the survey has decreased (Sandlie and Grødem,
2012).
The samples in the survey of living conditions are drawn according
to SSB’s procedures for random selection. The sample is randomly
chosen from BeReg1. A representative sample of persons above the
age of 16 is chosen to participate in the survey. The gross sample in
the survey is supposed to represent the total population. Selection
criteria are based on gender, age, education and family size (Vr˚alstad,
Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013).
From the randomly chosen sample some individuals were prevented
to participate due to living abroad or in an institution, or they have
past (Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013). The sample will no longer
be fully representative if the participants that do not answer the sur-
vey is not random. To correct the potential bias, SSB has calculated
frequency weights based on the selection criteria. Individuals with
properties that are more frequently represented in the population are
assigned a higher weight. Individuals with the same characteristics are
placed in the same group, also called a stratum. Within the same stra-
tum, the number of individuals who participated is divided by the gross
sample. This number is the frequency weight. Finally, the weights are
1The population statistics system at Statistics Norway
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corrected so that the sum equals the number of individuals in the gross
sample (Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013).
Furthermore, this analysis examines “cash-out” refinancing on a house-
hold level. Every person above the age of 16 in the register has the
same probability of being selected in the sample. For households, this
implies that the probability increases with the number of persons older
than 16 years currently living in the household. To correct this prob-
ability skewness of being selected, household weights are generated by
dividing 1 by the number of adults in each household (Sandlie and
Grødem, 2012).
Household weight = 1
Number of adults in the household
Combining these two types of weights captures the effect of not ran-
dom drop-outs and the heterogeneous drawing probability of the house-
holds, and yields the following.
Replicate weight = Frequency weight ∗Household weight (4.1)
Our analysis focus on home-owners, hence renters are not of interest
and will not be included in the analysis. Individuals under the age
of 25 living home with their parents, are also not included. In the
survey, participants report the household’s time at which the house
was purchased, remaining mortgage and predicted selling price. This
causes a potential mismatch between the participant’s age and these
variables. The final sample consists of 12 010 individuals, which when
using replicate weights amounts to 10 444 households.
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4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 lists relevant statistics from the household data, including
household mortgage2, purchase price of home, predicted selling price
of home, mortgage as a proportion of purchase price, and number of
participating households. The reported average mortgage does not in-
clude households without debt. Over the studied period, outstanding
mortgage grew by 372%, and the predicted selling price grew by 226%.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
2001 2004 2007 2012
Total mortgage (in NOK) 358.849 714.984 973.087 1,335,416
(10,682.) (15,841.) (20,471.) (21,480.)
Purchase price (in NOK) 627.599 806.033 975.807 1,384,661
(13,503.) (17,467.) (21,177.) (24,946.)
Predicted selling price (in NOK) 1,349,258 1,752,865 2,284,624 3,051,363
(21,471.) (41,286.) (37,710.) (43,809.)
Mortgage to house price ratio 0.635 0.905 0.933 1.021
(0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013)
Observations 2062 1380 2071 4920
Standard errors in parentheses. The numbers are listed in current values. Sur-
vey weights are used in the calculation of the population means.
In order to examine a household’s tendency of borrowing against in-
creased home value, we use the household’s remaining mortgage and
their predicted selling price of their home. These values are calculated
2The mortgage is secured on a household’s current dwelling.
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as a ratio of the initial purchase price. This normalization produces
variables that give information about the mortgage as a proportion of
initial value, in addition to information of predicted growth in house
price for each home-owner. Logarithmic functional form is applied to
the explained variable and the main explanatory variable to satisfy the
assumptions for the regression more accurately. The explained variable
chosen in the regression is mortgage, and is determined as:
Mortgage as proportion of initial price = log(Mortgage of household
Purchase price
)
The explanatory variable of main interest in the present analysis is the
prediction of the selling price, which is given by:
Predicted house price growth = log(Predicted selling price
Purchase price
)
Table 4.2 lists the mean of the main variables and the household char-
acteristics. The mean of mortgage as a proportion of the initial house
price is negative for each year, and also for the pooled cross section.
As expected, the average household has a lower mortgage than the
purchase price of their home. Considering the development in the
Norwegian housing market it is to expect that the mean of the ratio of
predicted selling price is positive for each year. However the ratio is not
increasing during the sampled period. Household characteristics, such
as age of participant, duration of ownership, household size, children
and number of working in household are more or less constant through
the whole period. The income variable is divided into quartiles for
each year. The reference group for income are households within the
lowest 25 percent for each year.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: Mean of Main Variables
Variables 2001 2004 2007 2012 Full set
Mortgage as a proportion -0.515 -0.263 -0.208 -0.146 -0.228
of initial price (0,021) (0,027) (0,023) (0,017) (-0,011)
Predicted house 1.047 1.007 1.089 1.028 1.041
price growth (0,028) (0,023) (0,026) (0,019) (0,012)
Duration of ownership 15.954 14.978 15.487 15.978 15.744
(0,363) (0,305) (0,369) (0,264) (0,166)
Age of household head 51.294 50.314 51.477 52.708 51.867
(0,439 (0,359) (0,431) (0,330) (0,204)
Household size 2.300 2.438 2.245 2.209 2.265
(0,029) (0,028) (0,028) (0,021) (0,013)
Nr. of children in the household 0.568 0.635 0.521 0.496 0.534
(0,020) (0,020) (0,020) (0,013) (0,009)
Nr. of working in household 1.081 1.171 1.107 1.154 1.133
(0,020) (0,018) (0,020) (0,015) (0,009)
Income 1. quartile 224 133 265 267 299 343 347 019 302 657
(30919) (3351) (3931) (3060) (2100)
Income 2. quartile 422 432 479 702 547 371 637 402 556 295
(2100) (2313) (2600) (2417) (2206)
Income 3. quartile 579 394 651 683 761 176 905 023 777 414
(1918) (2011) (2951) (2509) (2954)
Income 4. quartile 876 607 1 000 200 1 119 047 1 318 332 1 156 571
(8021) (11278) (7897) (6430) (5205)
Standard errors are listed in parentheses. Duration of ownership is the number of years since
the purchase of the property. Age is determined by the participant in the survey. Household
size is the number of persons living in the household. Children are household members below
the age of 16. Household members with paid employment are defined as working in the
household. Income is divided into quartiles for each year, and listed in current prices.
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The survey contains information about the household’s ability to man-
age an unforeseen expenditure3. In order to examine how the “cash-
out” tendency affects the household’s economy we define two binary
variables:
Payment difficulties =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if the household can not
manage an unforeseen expenditure
0 otherwise
(4.2)
The “cash-out” variable takes the value of 1 if the household has a
mortgage that exceeds the purchase price of their home.
“Cash-out” = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if mortgage > purchase price of home
0 if mortgage ≤ purchase price of home (4.3)
In table 4.3 we present households with and without payment difficul-
ties for each year together with the pooled total. The variable, payment
difficulties, captures household’s subjective risk, concerning their eco-
nomic situation. The percentage share of households with payment
difficulties is decreasing over the period.
Table 4.4 lists the number of households with a mortgage that exceeds
the purchase price of the house for each year. We see that the “cash-
out” tendency increases rapidly from 2001 to the other years. In 2012
almost every third household has definitely extracted home-equity.
3The amount of the unforeseen expenditure was 3000 NOK in 2001, 5000 NOK
in 2004 and 2007, and 10000 NOK in 2012
4.1. Data Material 32
Table 4.3: Payment Difficulties by Year
Year Payment Payment Total Percentage
difficulties=0 difficulties=1 share
2001 1607 447 2054 21,8 %
2004 1104 266 1370 19,4 %
2007 1740 306 2046 15,0 %
2012 4175 718 4893 14,7 %
Total 8626 1737 10363 16,8 %
The table lists units of households that have responded on the ques-
tion concerning payment difficulties.
Table 4.4: “Cash-out” by Year
“Cash-out”=0 “Cash-out”=1 Total Percentage share
2001 801 20 821 2,4 %
2004 471 189 660 28,6 %
2007 812 313 1125 27,8 %
2012 1932 875 2807 31,2 %
Total 4016 1397 5413 25,8 %
The table lists units of households. Participants that have a non-
response on either outstanding mortgage or purchase price are not
included.
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4.1.2 Drawbacks with the Data
In addition to the self-reported variables, assessment data is connected
to the dataset. Due to anonymity SSB truncates and rounds the as-
sessment data, and as a consequence the mean might be affected. How-
ever, the distribution of the full sample is not affected to a large extent
(Vr˚alstad, Wiggen, and Thorsen, 2013). Until the assessment data for
year n is completed, data for year n − 1 is connected. Accordingly we
have information about income for year 2011 in the dataset for 2012,
since the assessment data for 2012 is not yet available. This implies
a potential mismatch, especially for households where the living situ-
ation has changed (Sandlie and Grødem, 2012). A potential error can
also be expected with self-reported variables.
4.2 Regression Analysis
Regression analysis is a statistical method which can be used to study
the relationship between two or more variables. A regression model
predicts the value of the explained variable based on the explanatory
variables. Ordinary least squares, OLS, seeks to minimize the sum
of the squared error terms. That is, every vertical distance from an
observation to the regression line is squared. Finally, the sum of these
squares is minimized (Brooks, 2008).
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By combining the surveys, using random samples from each year, an
independently pooled cross section is obtained. Pooled cross section
observations are not likely to be identically distributed, since it is rea-
sonable to believe that the explained variable, and some of the ex-
planatory variables have changed over time. This can be dealt with
by simply allowing the intercept in the model to change over time.
Pooling random samples increases the sample size, which can lead to
more precise and reliable estimates (Wooldridge, 2009).
4.3 Modelling “Cash-out”
To determine if there is a tendency of a “cash-out” effect in the Nor-
wegian housing market, we first examine how predicted house price
growth affects mortgage for the pooled cross section. The first model
we estimate is a multiple regression model and is given by:
log ( Mortgage
House price
)
it
= β0+β1log (Predicted selling price
House price
)
it
+γjxijt+uit,
(4.4)
where
• log ( MortgageHouse price)it is the logarithm of the mortgage as a proportion
of the purchase price for household i in year t.
• The intercept β0 in equation 4.4 measures the logarithmic mort-
gage ratio when all other explanatory variables equals zero.
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• β1 is the elasticity of mortgagehouse price with respect to
predicted selling price
house price
This coefficient measures the percentage change in mortgage ra-
tio when the ratio of predicted house price increases with one
percent. This is the “cash-out” effect.
• γj measures the ceteris paribus effect of household characteris-
tics on the explained variable. The household characteristic for
household i in year t is denoted by xijt, j = 1,2, ...,6 and denotes
the characteristic , given by
xi1t = Duration of ownership for household i in year t
xi2t = Age of the household i ’s participant in year t
xi3t = Household size for household i in year t
xi4t = Number of children in household i in year t
xi5t = Nr. of working in the household for household i in year t
xi6t = Income quartile for household i in year t
• uit is the error term for household i in year t, also known as the
disturbance. uit represents factors other than the explanatory
variables that affects the mortgage ratio.
We find it reasonable to believe that home-owners who have owned
their house for a longer period is likely to predicate a higher growth
than the home-owners that have owned their house for shorter peri-
ods. To control for this, an interaction term of the ratio of predicted
selling price and duration of ownership is added in the model. Adding
an interaction term change the interpretation of all of the coefficients.
β1 is no longer the unique “cash-out” effect as the interaction term
measures the effect of predicted house price growth for different du-
rations of ownership. A positive value for the estimated coefficient of
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the interaction term would imply that the longer duration, the greater
“cash-out” effect.
To test whether or not the “cash-out” effect is significant, we preform
a t-test to test our hypothesis about the parameter β1. We know that
the estimator for β1 derived by OLS is unbiased, but we do not know
the actual β1 in the population. By using a t-test we can test our hy-
pothesis about “cash-out” estimated by β1 using statistic interference.
The following hypotheses are formulated:
H0 ∶ β1 = 0 No “cash-out” effect
H1 ∶ β1 > 0 “Cash-out” effect
We calculate the t-statistic by the formula:
tβˆ1 = βˆ1se(βˆ1) ,
where se(βˆ1) is the standard error of βˆ1 (Wooldridge, 2009).
The rejection rule depends on the significance level. On a 5% level
there is 5% chance of rejecting H0 and accepting the alternative hy-
pothesis when H0 is true. The critical value based in the t distribution
is denoted by c. We reject H0 if:
tβˆj > c
37 Chapter 4. Data and Methodology
Next, we seek to answer whether the “cash-out” effect changes over
time. Since the intercept in a regression model often changes over time,
we allow for changes in the intercept by adding a dummy variable for
each year. By interacting the main explanatory variable with the year
dummies, it is possible to test whether or not the slope coefficients
change over time. Hence, we test whether or not the “cash-out” effect
differs between 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2012. With an adjusted Wald
test it is possible to test whether there is joint significance for the
slope coefficients (Wooldridge, 2009).
log ( Mortgage
House price
)
it
= β0 + β1log (Predicted selling price
House price
)
it
+ γjxijt
+δ1 d04t + δ2 d07t + δ3 d12t
+ (δ4 d04t + δ5 d07t + δ6 d12t) log (Predicted selling price
House price
)
it
+ uit,
(4.5)
where d04, d07 and d12 are dummy variables equal to one if the ob-
servation comes from the corresponding year, and zero otherwise.
Table 4.5: Interpretation of the Coefficients in Model 4.5
Year Intercept Estimate of the
“cash-out” effect
2001 β0 β1
2004 β0 + δ1 β1 + δ4
2007 β0 + δ2 β1 + δ5
2012 β0 + δ3 β1 + δ6
We test Hypothesis II, whether the “cash-out” effect has changed over
the period, by formulating the following hypothesis for the adjusted
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Wald test:
H0 ∶ δ4 = δ5 = δ6 = 0
H1 ∶ No H0
A rejection of this hypothesis implies a slope difference between the
years. To determine if the “cash-out” effect is increasing over the
period, we test the following hypothesis:
H0 ∶ δ4 = δ5 = δ6
H1 ∶ No H0
A simple transformation of the Wald statistic gives the F-statistic. The
p-value of the test can be interpreted as the probability of observing a
value of the F-statistic at least as large as we did, given that the null
hypothesis is true. Small p-values will hence suggest evidence against
H0 (Wooldridge, 2009).
We examine hypothesis III by interacting log (Predicted selling priceHouse price ) with
the variables of household characteristics. In order to determine whether
the “cash-out” effect vary by household characteristics we again use a
t-tests to test whether the interaction term is statistically significant.
Furthermore, we compare the “cash-out” effect between the income
quartiles, the age cohorts and the groups of duration of ownership.
We again use an adjusted Wald test to examine whether the slope co-
efficients differs across the groups. When using replicate weights and
analyzing sub-populations, only the sub-population is needed in the
calculation of the mean and the regression estimate, but all cases are
39 Chapter 4. Data and Methodology
needed to correctly calculate the standard errors and the variance.
In the final part of the analysis we focus on the effect of “cash-out” refi-
nancing on the household economy. The explained variable in this final
part is the binary variable for payment difficulties. Logistic regression
are added to the analysis. This is done due to weaknesses of the OLS
method when the explained variable is binary. The error terms in an
OLS regression with a binary explained variable are heteroskedastic.
In addition, the error terms will not be normally distributed. Further-
more, the predicted probabilities can be greater than 1 or less than
1, which does not make much sense. The heteroskedasticity does not
affect the estimators of the parameters. However, it will affect the
standard error and hence, the t-tests will not be correctly computed
(Tufte, 2000).
The logistic regression model is a non-linear transformation of the lin-
ear regression. The logistic regression model can be constructed by
an iterative maximum likelihood procedure. When there is a positive
relationship between the variables, it offers an S-shaped distribution
function where the estimated probabilities lie between 0 and 1. The
change in the explained variable as a result of a unit change in the ex-
planatory variables is smallest at the ”tails” of the curve, and increases
towards the center of the curve (Tufte, 2000).
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We formulate the following model:
ln( P (Payment difficulties = 1)
1 − P (Payment difficulties = 1))
it
= b0 + b1Cash-outit
+γjxijt + γlzlkt + δ1 d04t + δ2 d07t + δ3 d12t + eit, (4.6)
• ln ( P (Payment difficulties=1)1−P (Payment difficulties=1)) in equation (4.6) is the logarithm of
the odds, called the logit, and the variables are defined by equa-
tion 4.2 and 4.3.
• b1 measures the change in the logit of having payment difficulties,
when the household is in the “cash-out” group.
• γl is the parameter for a macro control variable, given by zlkt,
where t denotes the four years, k = 1,2, ...,7 denotes the region
and l = 1,2,3,4 represents
z1kt = Unemployment rate for region k in year t
z2t = ∆ Consumption
z3t = ∆ GDP
z4t = Lending interest in year t
• eit is the error term for household i in year t
Unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the labour force
and coded to the k counties defined by SSB in the survey of living
conditions. The counties are listed in appendix B. The data for un-
employment rate is retrieved from the Norwegian Labour and Welfare
Service (NAV). ∆C is the volume change in household consumption
from first quarter in year t-1 to first quarter in year t. ∆GDP is the
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volume change in GDP in mainland economy from first quarter year t-
1 to first quarter year t. The floating lending interest rate is connected
to each household’s year of home purchase. The lending interest rate
is computed as a yearly mean. Data for lending interest rate, volume
change in consumption and GDP is retrieved from SSB’s statbank.
The estimates of the coefficients in the logistic regression can be re-
ported as odds ratios. The odds ratio of our main explanatory variable
is calculated by:
Odds ratio = p11−p1p0
1−p0 ,
where p0 and p1 are the probabilities of facing payment difficulties given
the two values of the “cash-out” variable. The odds ratios express the
change in odds when the explanatory variable increases with one unit.
If the odds ratio is greater than one, there is a positive relation between
the dependant and the independent variable, and the odds for having
the property of the explained variable increases. If the odds ratio is
less than one, the odds decreases. Multiplying the odds ratio with 100
gives the percentage change in odds ratio. This number implies how
much the new odds represents as a percentage of the original when the
independent variable increases by one unit (Tufte, 2000).
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4.4 Assumptions for the Regression Anal-
ysis
The assumptions for OLS is listed in Appendix C. The OLS method re-
quires homoskedasticity. When the variance of the unobservable error,
u, varies across different segments of the population, this assumption
is not fulfilled and the errors contain hetereoskedasticity. Homoskedas-
ticity is required in order to conclude that the estimators of the vari-
ances are unbiased. Since the error terms are based directly on these
variances, presence of heteroskedasticity makes the errors invalid for
constructing t-statistics and F-statistics. In other words, homoskedas-
ticity is required in order to preform valid t-tests and F-tests for the
OLS estimation (Wooldridge, 2009).
Heteroskedasticity-robust procedures can be used whether or not the
errors have constant variance. By using replicate weights, in the re-
gression analysis, standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity
are computed. Using logarithmic functional form for models where
y > 0, often satisfy the full set of assumptions more closely than us-
ing levels of y. Conditional distributions that are heteroskedastic or
skewed are often the case for strictly positive variables. Using the log
of these variables may reduce or eliminate both of these problems. The
logarithmic transformation also makes the estimates less sensitive to
outliers (Wooldridge, 2009).
Especially for small datasets, outliers and extreme observations can
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greatly affect the OLS estimates. Trimming makes the distribution
less sensitive to outliers. Trimming means to discard the lowest and
highest k% of the observations. In order to deal with outliers, trim-
ming of the variables mortgage, predicted selling price, house price is
performed (Hellerstein, 2008).
Multicollinearity implies that there is high, but not perfect, correla-
tion between two or more of the explanatory variables. High multicol-
linarity is not a violation of the OLS assumptions, but everything else
being equal, less correlation between the explanatory variables is more
reliable in the estimation of the parameters (Wooldridge, 2009). To
examine the degree of multicollinearity when using survey weights, we
run one regressions with each of the explanatory variables as explained
variable. This makes it possible to evaluate each variable against all
of the other predictors at the same time. We test whether the mul-
ticollinearity is a problem in the model specification in appendix E.
Based on the test results, multicollinearity is not an issue for the re-
gression analysis.

Chapter 5
Empirical Analysis
5.1 The “Cash-out” Effect in the Norwe-
gian Housing Market
Table 5.1 contains the pooled regression results for the model given
by equation 4.4. We study how the “cash-out” effect changes, as we
add household control variables. The estimated “cash-out” effect is
significant in all specifications. The estimated value of the “cash-out”
effect increases from 0,5 to 0,7 from model (1) to model (2), due to
controlling for duration of ownership. The coefficient for duration of
ownership is found to be negative, implying down-payment of mort-
gages as the duration increases.
The estimator of the interaction term log (Predicted selling priceHouse price )
* (duration of ownership) in model (3) is positive and significant, im-
plying 0,01 additional increase in the “cash-out” effect of one year
longer ownership of the property.
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Table 5.1: The “Cash-out” Effect in the Norwegian Housing Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Left-hand side variable log(mortgage/house price)
log(predicted selling price 0.500*** 0.698*** 0.519*** 0.552*** 0.553***
/houseprice) (0.015) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Duration of ownership -0.020*** -0.033*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(predicted selling price 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010***
/houseprice)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Duration of ownership
Age -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001)
Household size -0.018 0.008
(0.016) (0.017)
Children 0.039** 0.019
(0.018) (0.019)
Nr. of working in household 0.040*** 0.071***
(0.015) (0.017)
Income 2. quartile -0.030
(0.030)
Income 3. quartile -0.087***
(0.033)
Income 4. quartile -0.144***
(0.036)
Constant -0.622*** -0.571*** -0.445*** 0.135*** 0.084*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.047) (0.050)
Observations 6.608 6.602 6.602 6.582 6.524
R-squared 0.224 0.247 0.264 0.328 0.331
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The table presents estimates of the “cash-out” effect for households.
Replicate weights are used in the estimation. The reference group for
income is households within the lowest 25 percentile. Age is determined
by the age of the participant in the survey. Duration of ownership is the
number of years since the purchase of the property.
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In model (4), we add additional control variables for household char-
acteristics. The coefficients for age, children and number of working in
household is found to be statistically significant.
It is conceivable that the “cash-out” effect differs by income, and thus
the finding in models (1)-(4) could be driven by an unobservable in-
come effect. To examine this possibility, we control for income fixed
effects in model (5). As predicted selling price increases by 1 per-
cent, the propensity to “cash-out” home-equity is found to be 0.55
percent, similar to the findings in model (4). The income fixed effects
are statistically significant, at a 1 % confidence level, for the two up-
per quartiles. These results implies that down-payment of mortgages
increases for households in the higher income quartiles. We set model
(5) as the baseline regression for the other analyzes.
Overall, these results indicate that households “cash-out” home-equity
as their self-predicted selling price increases. These findings are con-
sistent with Hypothesis I.
5.2 The “Cash-out” Effect over Time
It is conceivable that the effect of “cash-out” differs over time. The
findings in table 5.1 could be driven by omitted time-varying factors
that drive both house prices and mortgages. Recall that the explained
variable and the explanatory variable of interest are adjusted by the
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purchase price of the house. Hence, a large part of the year effects
has been accounted for by this adjustment. Including year fixed effects
controls for the remaining time effects.
The coefficients for the year dummies in model (1) are statistically sig-
nificant on a 1 percent confidence level. The year dummies represent
an increase in log (Mortgage of householdPurchase price ) that are not captured by the
explanatory variables, and include aggregate factors that affect the ex-
plained variable over time. This result also highlight the importance
of including year-dummies, which are brought on to the next analyzes.
In Model (2) we interact the predicted change in home value with the
time dummies, in order to examine how the partial effects change over
time. Since log (Predicted selling pricePurchase price ) is the main variable of interest, we
assume the other factors have the same effect on log (Mortgage of householdPurchase price )
in all four time periods. Hence, a 1 percent increase in predicted selling
price is associated with a “cash-out” of 0,11 percent in 2001. In 2012
the additional “cash-out” effect are estimated to 0,52 percent. In other
words, a 1 percent increase in predicted selling price is associated with
a “cash-out” effect of 0,11 + 0,52 = 0,63 percent in 2012.
The interaction terms are significantly different from zero in all the
time periods. Adding these interaction terms allow the “cash-out” ef-
fect to be different in each year.
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Table 5.2: The “Cash-out” Effect over Time
(1) (2)
Left-hand-side variable log(mortgage/house price)
log(predicted selling 0.552*** 0.111*
price/house price) (0.032) (0.057)
Y2004 0.141*** -0.095**
(0.031) (0.042)
Y2007 0.211*** -0.069*
(0.028) (0.039)
Y2012 0.299*** 0.008
(0.025) (0.035)
Y2004*log(predicted selling 0.452***
price/house price) (0.060)
Y2007*log(predicted selling 0.504***
price/house price) (0.059)
Y2012*log(predicted selling 0.518***
price/house price) (0.056)
Duration of ownership -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
log(predicted selling price 0.009*** 0.008***
/houseprice)* (0.001) (0.001)
Duration of ownership
Age -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.014 0.015
(0.017) (0.016)
Children 0.016 0.015
(0.018) (0.018)
Nr. of working in household 0.058*** 0.056***
(0.017) (0.017)
Income 2. quartile -0.021 -0.023
(0.030) (0.030)
Income 3. quartile -0.075** -0.076**
(0.033) (0.033)
Income 4. quartile -0.136*** -0.140***
(0.036) (0.036)
Constant -0.084 0.152***
(0.053) (0.056)
Observations 6.524 6.524
R-squared 0.347 0.360
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 The table presents estimates
of the “cash-out” effect for households when controlling for years. Replicate weights are used
in the estimation.
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Using an adjusted Wald test listed in the first row in table 5.3, we
find that the interaction terms are jointly significantly different from
zero. This indicates that the “cash-out” effect has increased from 2001
to 2004, 2007 and 2012. The result implies that inclusion of interac-
tion terms create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the
model. Furthermore, based on the adjusted Wald tests for equality be-
tween the coefficients of the interaction terms for 2004, 2007 and 2012,
we find no statistical significant evidence of an increasing “cash-out”
effect in this period. However, we reject that the “cash-out” effect is
equal in 2004 and 2012, on a 10 percent confidence level. Summarized,
we cannot accept Hypothesis II based on these findings.
Table 5.3: Adjusted Wald Test of Difference in “Cash-out” Across
Years
H0 F(df1, df2) P-value Rejection of H0
δ4 = δ5 = δ6 = 0 F(3,6521)=29,58 0.00 Yes***
δ4 = δ5 = δ6 F(2,6522)=1,66 0.19 No
δ5 = δ6 F(1,6523)=0,16 0.69 No
δ4 = δ6 F(1,6523)=3,29 0.07 Yes*
δ4 = δ5 F(1,6523)=1,56 0.21 No
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5.3 The “Cash-out” Effect by Household
Characteristics
Exploring the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the “cash-out” effect pro-
vides important information into the underlying model of consumer
behaviour. In table 5.4 we examine how the propensity to extract
home-equity vary by household characteristics such as income quar-
tile, age, household size, number of children and number of working in
the household.
In Model (1) the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between
income quartile and log (Predicted selling pricePurchase price ) is positive, which implies
that the propensity to extract home-equity is higher for households at
the upper end of the income distribution. The income dummies indi-
cate a lower intercept for households with high income. This suggest
lower mortgage ratio for high income households. In short, households
at the fourth quartile of the income distribution have a lower mortgage
to house price ratio, given that everything else is equal.
In model (2) we interact log (Predicted selling pricePurchase price ) with age of household
head. The coefficient estimate on the age interaction term suggests
that the borrowing of older households is less responsive to predicted
house price growth. However, the result is not statistically significant
on a reasonable confidence level.
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Table 5.4: Variation of the “Cash-out” Effect by Household Charac-
teristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Left-hand-side variable log(mortgage/house price)
Household characteristic Income Age Household size Children Nr. of working
quartile in household
Household characteristic* 0.039 -0.001 0.037*** 0.056*** 0.021
log(predicted selling (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
price/house price)
log(predicted selling 0.489*** 0.592*** 0.451*** 0.500*** 0.518***
price/house price) (0.043) (0.070) (0.058) (0.040) (0.050)
Duration of ownership -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(predicted selling price 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
/houseprice)* (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Duration of ownership
Age -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.011 0.013 -0.018 0.015 0.014
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Children 0.024 0.016 0.028 -0.020 0.018
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Nr. of working in household 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.037*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
Income 2. quartile -0.048 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Income 3. quartile -0.131*** -0.075** -0.071** -0.072** -0.074**
(0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Income 4. quartile -0.224*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.136***
(0.043) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.047 -0.104* -0.031 -0.072 -0.057
(0.055) (0.063) (0.056) (0.053) (0.057)
Observations 6.524 6.524 6.524 6.524 6.524
R-squared 0.348 0.347 0.348 0.348 0.347
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 The
table presents estimates of the “cash-out” effect for households. In each
column, predicted house price growth is interacted with a household char-
acteristic, listed at the top of the table. Duration of ownership is the
number of years since the purchase of the property. Age is determined
by the age of the participant in the survey. The reference group for in-
come is households within the lowest 25 percentile. The base year is 2001.
Replicate weights are used in the estimation.
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The positive estimate on the household size interaction term in model
(3) and the children interaction term in model (4) suggest that there
is an additional “cash-out” effect for larger households. Both of these
results are statistically significant on a 1 percent confidence level.
In model (5) the coefficient estimate on the working in household inter-
action term is positive, implying additional “cash-out” for households
with more contributors to the household economy. The finding is how-
ever, not statistically significant on a reasonable confidence level.
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When studying the “cash-out” tendency, household characteristics such
as age, income and duration of ownership are of particular interest con-
sidering life-cycle theory.
The “Cash-out” Effect Across Income Quartiles
Figure 5.1 illustrates the average mortgage as a proportion of home
purchase price for the income quartiles. This ratio takes the highest
values for the second and third quartile. In table 5.5 we examine the
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Figure 5.1: Mortgage to House Price by Income Quartiles
“cash-out” effect for each of the income quartiles. The “cash-out” ef-
fect is significant for all income quartiles. The coefficient of interest
is highest for the 3.quartile. A 1 percent increase in predicted selling
price, raises the propensity to extract home-equity by 0.59 percent for
households in the third income quartile. Households in the first in-
come quartile respond less aggressively, and “cash-out” 0.423 percent
when predicted selling price rises by 1 percent. Performing an adjusted
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Wald test, listed in appendix F, we find no statistical evidence of dif-
ferent “cash-out” behaviour across the income quartiles. However, we
find households within the first income quartile to respond less aggres-
sively to house price growth, compared to households in the second
and third income quartile. The difference is significant on a 10 percent
confidence level in both tests.
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Table 5.5: Variation of the “Cash-out” Effect by Income Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income quartile 1. quartile 2. quartile 3. quartile 4. quartile
Left-hand-side variable log(mortgage/house price)
log(predicted selling 0.423*** 0.586*** 0.590*** 0.585***
price/house price) (0.077) (0.044) (0.053) (0.067)
Duration of ownership -0.011** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
log(predicted selling price 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013***
/houseprice)* (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Duration of ownership
Age -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Household size -0.000 -0.010 -0.001 0.050*
(0.040) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027)
Children 0.059 0.032 0.037 -0.027
(0.050) (0.041) (0.037) (0.030)
Nr. of working in household 0.066* 0.064** 0.052 0.044
(0.034) (0.030) (0.036) (0.037)
Y2004 0.038 0.098 0.165*** 0.309***
(0.074) (0.065) (0.051) (0.054)
Y2007 0.134** 0.153*** 0.250*** 0.319***
(0.065) (0.056) (0.049) (0.054)
Y2012 0.207*** 0.237*** 0.274*** 0.483***
(0.059) (0.050) (0.043) (0.049)
Constant -0.085 -0.006 -0.059 -0.372***
(0.099) (0.112) (0.136) (0.135)
Observations 10.184 10.692 10.963 10.921
R-squared 0.373 0.359 0.328 0.341
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 The
table presents estimates of the “cash-out” effect for each income quartile.
Duration of ownership is the number of years since the purchase of the
property. Age is determined by the age of the participant in the survey.
The base year is 2001. Replicate weights are used in the estimation.
In model (4), children, number of working in household, and the fourth
income quartile is omitted due to few observations.
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The “Cash-out” Effect Across Age Cohorts
Figure 5.2 illustrates the mortgage as proportion of the house price
for four age cohorts. The ratio exceeds 100 percent for the cohort of
home-owners aged over 79. This is not in line with the theory of young
home-owners buying homes and paying of their mortgage as they age.
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Figure 5.2: Mortgage to House Price by Age Cohorts
In Table 5.6 we study how the “cash-out” effect varies by different
age cohorts. The coefficient of interest shows an increasing tendency
from the age of 16 to 78. The age cohort consisting of home-owners
aged 58-78 extract home-equity most aggressively given an increase in
predicted selling price. The youngest age cohort “cash-out” 0,37 per-
cent when predicting a 1 percent higher selling price. The estimate of
the interaction term is highest for the youngest age cohort, implying
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that these households extract home-equity more aggressively with an
additional year of ownership. Further, there is not a statistical signifi-
cant “cash-out” effect among the cohort of home-owners aged over 79.
However, the interaction term is positive and significant on a 5 per-
cent confidence level, which indicates that these home-owners extract
additional home-equity the longer they have owned the house.
By performing an adjusted Wald test of joint significance (listed in
appendix F), we reject equal “cash-out” behaviour across age cohorts
on a 5 percent confidence level.
59 Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis
Table 5.6: Variation of the ‘Cash-out” Effect by Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age cohort 16-36 37-57 58-78 79-99
Left-hand-side variable log(mortgage/house price)
log(predicted selling 0.371*** 0.548*** 0.662*** 0.268
price/house price) (0.073) (0.045) (0.090) (0.290)
Duration of ownership -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.011** -0.028
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018)
log(predicted selling price 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.006** 0.014**
/houseprice)* (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Duration of ownership
Household size 0.042 0.044** -0.090 -0.103
(0.042) (0.019) (0.063) (0.270)
Children -0.034 0.024 0.261**
(0.044) (0.022) (0.107)
Nr. of working in household 0.048* 0.026 0.140***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.038)
Income 2. quartile -0.011 -0.006 -0.028 -0.465
(0.048) (0.045) (0.082) (0.376)
Income 3. quartile -0.044 -0.090* -0.050 -0.865
(0.052) (0.049) (0.104) (0.590)
Income 4. quartile -0.177*** -0.167*** -0.030
(0.057) (0.051) (0.119)
Y2004 0.138*** 0.165*** 0.334*** 0.437
(0.046) (0.043) (0.123) (0.489)
Y2007 0.149*** 0.237*** 0.532*** 0.249
(0.035) (0.043) (0.118) (0.328)
Y2012 0.149*** 0.340*** 0.639*** 0.579*
(0.036) (0.037) (0.107) (0.341)
Constant -0.512*** -0.882*** -1.663*** -0.871**
(0.069) (0.057) (0.150) (0.421)
Observations 11.303 10.055 9.708 11.488
R-squared 0.174 0.274 0.472 0.697
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 The
table presents estimates of the “cash-out” effect for households in different
age cohorts, listed at the top of each column. Age is determined by
the age of the participant in the survey. Replicate weights are used in
the estimation. Duration of ownership is the number of years since the
purchase of the property. The reference group for income is households
within the lowest 25 percentile. The base year is 2001.
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The “Cash-out” Effect Across Duration of Ownership
Figure 5.3 illustrates mortgage as proportion of the initial house price
for six different categories of duration. On average, a household with
duration of ownership over 15 years has a mortgage that exceeds the
purchase price of their home. The ratio is increasing with duration
of ownership. Performing regression analysis on different durations of
ownership makes it possible to examine the time perspective of the
household’s decision of cashing out.
0,000	  
0,200	  
0,400	  
0,600	  
0,800	  
1,000	  
1,200	  
1,400	  
1,600	  
>4	   5-­‐9	   10-­‐14	   15-­‐19	   20-­‐29	   <30	  
Figure 5.3: Mortgage to House Price by Duration of Ownership
In table 5.7 we estimate the “cash-out” tendency for different durations
of ownership. The estimated “cash-out” effect shows an increasing ten-
dency with longer duration of ownership. An increase of 1 percent in
predicted selling price for a household that has owned their home for
more than 30 years, is associated with a home-equity extraction of 0,81
percent. Households that have owned their home for less than 5 years,
is estimated to “cash-out” 0,49 percent with a 1 percent increase in
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predicted selling price.
We perform an adjusted Wald test of jointly equal “cash-out” effects
between different duration of ownership, listed in appendix F. Equal-
ity is rejected on a 1 percent confidence level, hence we can conclude
that the “cash-out” tendency differs across various owner-lengths.
Overall, the results in the present subsection indicate that households
within the lowest income quartile tend to borrow less against increased
home value compared to the other income quartiles. The “cash-out”
effect increases with age up to the age of 78. Further, duration of own-
ership amplifies households propensity to extract home-equity. The
findings from table 5.4 estimate higher “cash-out” tendency among
larger households. The findings in this section is consistent with Hy-
pothesis III.
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Table 5.7: Variation of the “Cash-out” Effect by Duration of Owner-
ship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration of ownership 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-29 30+
Left-hand-side variable log(mortgage/house price)
log(predicted selling 0.488*** 0.607*** 0.691*** 0.754*** 0.773*** 0.813***
price/house price) (0.055) (0.059) (0.079) (0.062) (0.057) (0.047)
Age -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Household size 0.025 0.007 -0.011 0.105** 0.015 -0.256***
(0.028) (0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.093)
Children -0.026 0.015 0.059 -0.048 0.132* 0.440***
(0.030) (0.039) (0.048) (0.059) (0.068) (0.139)
Nr. Of working in household 0.084*** 0.059* 0.127** -0.085 0.045 -0.023
(0.026) (0.034) (0.056) (0.066) (0.047) (0.060)
Income 2. quartile -0.008 0.038 -0.094 -0.122 -0.007 0.112
(0.043) (0.057) (0.096) (0.142) (0.105) (0.119)
Income 3. quartile -0.050 -0.019 -0.212* -0.197 -0.086 0.160
(0.045) (0.064) (0.115) (0.156) (0.108) (0.153)
Income 4. quartile -0.160*** -0.129* -0.276** -0.148 -0.124 0.386**
(0.052) (0.069) (0.113) (0.162) (0.118) (0.169)
Y2004 0.016 0.194*** 0.321*** 0.325*** 0.404*** 0.940***
(0.044) (0.058) (0.099) (0.100) (0.118) (0.231)
Y2007 0.036 0.226*** 0.377*** 0.372*** 0.716*** 1.145***
(0.037) (0.053) (0.087) (0.115) (0.116) (0.228)
Y2012 0.075** 0.317*** 0.430*** 0.589*** 0.807*** 1.154***
(0.034) (0.046) (0.081) (0.097) (0.105) (0.213)
Constant -0.070 -0.252** -0.523** -0.123 -0.461 -1.202***
(0.072) (0.112) (0.232) (0.360) (0.321) (0.409)
Observations 10.973 11.362 11.457 11.492 10.958 10.338
R-squared 0.177 0.278 0.291 0.388 0.331 0.454
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 The
table presents estimates of the “cash-out” effect for different groups of
duration of ownership. Replicate weights are used in the estimation.
Duration of ownership is the number of years since the purchase of the
property. Age is determined by the age of the participant in the sur-
vey. The reference group for income is households within the lowest 25
percentile. The base year is 2001.
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5.4 The “Cash-out” Effect and the House-
hold Economy
Recalling the background material and our findings in the previous
analysis, the “cash-out” effect is assumed to be sustainable in the Nor-
wegian economy. In this section we examine if the “cash-out” effect
can be a potential problem in the Norwegian economy. We investigate
how the “cash-out” tendency affects the household economy by using
the dummy variable for payment difficulties (introduced in chapter 4),
as explained variable. The dummy variable for “cash-out” is the main
explanatory variable.
The estimated coefficient in the linear probability model expresses the
change in probability of having payment difficulties, associated with a
unit change in the explanatory variables. The logistic model reports
the odds ratio of the estimated parameters. In table 5.8 both the linear
probability model and the logistic model are expressed, using different
specifications.
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65 Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis
In model (1) and (2) we control for household characteristics. Year
fixed effects are added in model (3) and (4). Unemployment rate is
controlled for in model (5) and (6). GDP growth and consumption
growth are additional control variables in model (7) and (8). These
additional control variables are only time varying, and thus the year
fixed effects are not included in these models. The estimate of the co-
efficient in both of the models increases when adding the extra control
variables.
Within different specifications, the linear probability model predicates
5 to 6 percent increase in probability of facing payment difficulties
for households that have a mortgage that exceeds the purchase price
of their home. The logistic regression model shows a more dramatic
result. The odds ratio is greater than 1 in every specification, im-
plying that the odds of facing payment difficulties is greater among
households that have a mortgage that exceeds the purchase price of
the home, relative to households that have a lower mortgage to house
price ratio. In model (8) the odds ratio of 1,52 implies a 52 percent
higher odds of having payment difficulties when the household has the
“cash-out” property, when controlling for household characteristics,
unemployment rate, consumption growth and GDP growth.
Both the logistic and the OLS regression analyzes predicate an in-
creased probability of facing payment difficulties when the household
has the “cash-out” property. All specifications are significant on a 1
percent confidence level.

Chapter 6
Further Discussions
In order to elucidate the “cash-out” tendency of Norwegian house-
holds, we performed a pooled cross section analysis using household-
level data. The data used in the analysis is representative of the Nor-
wegian household sector, hence we can back out economy-wide magni-
tude of the estimated “cash-out” effect in Norway. Similar to Mian and
Sufi (2011), our findings suggest a significant “cash-out” effect with in-
creasing house prices. The estimated impact of the “cash-out” effect
on households mortgage, suggests that this tendency has contributed
substantial to the leverage growth in Norway.
We found that the “cash-out” tendency is not uniform across the pop-
ulation. The extraction of home-equity is increasing with duration
of ownership. Such heterogeneity may reflect the rapid house price
growth experienced by the “long duration” home-owners. We also find
a more aggressive “cash-out” behaviour among older home-owners. As
pointed out by Campbell and Cocco (2007) older households are ex-
pected to increase their consumption with rising house prices. An
aggressive “cash-out” tendency must be considered in context of the
rapid growth in house prices for the last two decades. When consider-
ing the development in the Norwegian housing market, longer duration
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of ownership is associated with higher collateral. These findings may
not affect the sustainability of the credit market, since the risk of de-
fault of these home-owners can be considered relatively low. However,
the youngest households show a relatively aggressive borrowing be-
haviour, considering the fact that they are most likely first-time home
buyers, and have just started paying off their mortgages. Further, we
find no statistical evidence of heterogeneity across income quartiles.
Considering the credit constraints on low-income households, these
findings are somewhat unexpected.
Unfortunately, we do not have information about household consump-
tion, and how they spend their extracted home-equity. If extracted
home-equity is used to pay down more expensive debt, or buy in-
vestment properties, the “cash-out” refinancing may not have a large
aggregate impact. On the contrary, if the extracted home-equity is
primarily used to pay for current consumption, the impact could be
substantial. Our findings suggest that larger households extract home-
equity more aggressively, which could indicate that the “cash-out” is
used for consumption. The survey “purpose of borrowing” suggests
that about 50 percent of new issued loans secured on dwelling, were
due to “cash-out” refinancing. However, the purpose of the “cash-out”
refinancing and whether the home-equity is used for current consump-
tion, are left for further research.
Home-buyer’s expectations are significantly affected by previous ex-
perience (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2003). The self-reinforcing mech-
anism identified by Anundsen and Jansen (2011) suggests that an in-
crease in the consumer confidence index immediately affects the house
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price growth. Norwegian home-owners have experienced a rapid growth
in house prices the latest years. If Norwegian home-owners continue to
extract home-equity, then, based on previous experience in the housing
market, the aggregate impact may be substantial. Increased leverage
makes Norwegian households vulnerable to increased interest and de-
preciation in the housing market. In addition, high debt to income
ratio may amplify a decrease in consumption and housing investments
in a cyclical downturn (The Financial Supervisory Authority of Nor-
way, 2014).
Further, our findings suggest a higher probability of facing payment
difficulties with unexpected expenditures for borrowers that have a
mortgage that exceeds the purchase price of their dwelling. In other
words, “cash-out” refinancing increases the probability of not having an
economic buffer. This emphasize the argument that Norwegian house-
holds are vulnerable to increased interest. The results are somewhat
limited because of the definition of the “cash-out” variable, which do
not account for people that have refinanced their mortgage and have
a lower mortgage than the purchase price of the house. Additionally,
the probability of payment difficulties cannot directly be attributed to
the risk of default which also limits the interpretation.
Mian and Sufi (2011) finds that “cash-out” refinancing was one of the
key drivers of the US subprime crisis. In this context, the “cash-out”
effect among Norwegian home-owners is a worrisome tendency in the
Norwegian housing market. The credit default rate has been stable
and low for the last two decades, which may indicate that Norwegian
credit regulations are strict. The link we provide between “cash-out”
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and the probability of facing payment difficulties, raises questions of
whether the credit regulations in Norway are strict enough. A more
flexible practise of the equity requirements as suggested by the Norwe-
gian Minister of Finance, is not in line with our findings. The size and
the magnitude of the “cash-out” refinancing in the Norwegian housing
market rather call for more regulations.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
We provide evidence of a strong link between self-predicted house price
growth and home-equity extraction among Norwegian home-owners.
Mian and Sufi (2011) finds that “cash-out” refinancing was one of the
key drivers of the US subprime crisis. This highlights the importance
of our findings. Studying a representative sample of 10433 Norwegian
home-owners makes the results applicable for the Norwegian economy
as a whole. Furthermore, we estimate how this effect changes over
time. Compared to 2001, we find an additional “cash-out” effect in
the years 2004, 2007 and 2012.
Next, we measure how the “cash-out” effect changes across household
characteristics. We find that the “cash-out” tendency is not uniform
across households. Studying the cross sectional heterogeneity, we find
that increased household size, age and duration of ownership amplify
the propensity to extract home-equity. Further, we find that there is a
statistical difference between the categorical models of age and dura-
tion of ownership. These findings are consistent with traditional life-
cycle theory. We find no statistical significant evidence of a different
“cash-out” behaviour across income quartiles. Hence, credit-constrains
on low income households are not reflected in the propensity to extract
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home-equity.
Contrary to the arguments of a sustainable leverage growth in Nor-
way, we provide empirical evidence of an overall increased probability
of payment difficulties due to extracting home-equity. The link pro-
vided between a tight household economy and the “cash-out” effect
suggests that aggressively extraction of home-equity is not sustainable
for Norwegian home-owners. Overall the results in the present thesis
call for more regulations in the Norwegian mortgage market.
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Appendix A
Consumer Confindence Indicator
The Norwegian consumer confidence indicator (forventningsbarome-
teret) is developed by asking 1000 randomly chosen participants ques-
tions about their economic expectations. The following questions have
been asked quarterly since 1992:
1. Would you say that your household economy is better or worse
compared to the situation one year ago, or is there no difference?
2. Do you think your household economy will become better or worse
in the next year, or no difference?
3. If we look at the Norwegian economy, would you say that the
economy is better or worse compared to the situation one year ago, or
is there no difference?
4. Do you think the Norwegian economy will become better or worse
in the next year, or no difference?
5. Do you think that now is a good time for the general population to
buy large households items, or do you think it is a bad time?
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The indicator measures the difference between the percentage propor-
tion of optimistic and pessimistic answers for each question, divided by
5. To highlight the development over time the indicator is adjusted for
season and random variations effects. The indicators at the end and
beginning of the time series are more uncertain, since the season and
trend adjustment only are based on the past. As more observations are
added to the series, the indicators are revisited (Finans Norge, 2014).
Appendix B
Survey Questions
Table B.1: Relevant Questions from the Survey of Living Conditions
From Self-
register reported
Age of household head/participant in the survey X
Age for the rest of the household X
Total household income (gross and disposable) X
Number of working in household X
Nr. of persons who have lived in X
the household for the last three months
Available to report until 10 persons
Relations to other in household X
2.Spouse
3. Cohabitant
4. Son/Daughter
5. Stepson/stepdaughter
6. Siblings/half siblings
7. Step-siblings
8.Parents
9. Step-parents
10.Parents-in-law
11. Son or daughter in law
12. Grandparents
13. Grandchild
14. Other relative
15. Other non-relative
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From Self-
register reported
County X
1. Oslo and Akershus
2. Hedmark and Oppland
3. Østlandet otherwise
4. Agder and Rogaland
5. Vestlandet
6. Trøndelag
7. Nord-Norge
Tenure status X
1. Free-owner
2.Housing association or corporation
3. Renter
Occupation X
1. Gainfully employed
2. Self employed
3. Unemployed
4. Pupil or student
5. Retirement
6.Incapacitated
7. Work rehabilitation program
8. Conscript or civilian
9. Work at home
10. Other, specify
Which year did you became owner of the property? X
How much did you pay for your current dwelling? X
in NOK
Do the household have a loan secured on dwelling? X
1. Yes
2. No
How many loans secured on the current X
dwelling do the household have?
Available to report up to 5 loans
Remaining down-payment of the first mortgage X
in NOK
Remaining down-payment of the second mortgage X
in NOK
Remaining down-payment of the third mortgage X
in NOK
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From Self-
register reported
Remaining down-payment of the fourth mortgage X
in NOK
Remaining down-payment of the fifth mortgage X
in NOK
Do the household have the ability to pay an X
unexpected expenditure of 10,000NOK
1. Yes
2. No
Do the household have the ability to pay an X
unexpected expenditure of 5000 NOK
1. Yes
2. No
Do the household have the ability to pay an X
unexpected expenditure of 3000NOK
1. Yes
2. No
Predicted selling price for dwelling X
in NOK
Appendix C
Assumptions of the OLS model
To get reliable estimators for the parameters from a random sample of
data it is necessary to make several assumptions for the OLS.
1. The model is linear in parameters. In other words, the formula
for the estimators are linear combinations of the random variable
y, y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ... + βkxk + u
2. We have a random sample of n observations, {(xi1, xi2, ..., xik, yi) ∶
i = 1,2, ..., n}, following the model in assumption 1.
3. No perfect collinearity. None of the independent variables is con-
stant in the sample. There are no exact linear relationship be-
tween independent variables.
4. E(ut∣x1t, x2t, ..., xkt) = 0 Zero conditional mean. The expected
value of the error term given any value of the explanatory variable
equals zero, within period t.
5. V ar(u∣x1, x2, ..., xk) = σ2 < ∞ Homoskedasticity. The variance
of the error is constant and finite for any given value of the ex-
planatory variable.
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6. u ∼ N(0, σ2) The population error is independent of the explana-
tory variables and normally distributed with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2
Under assumptions 1.- 4. we have that E(βˆj) = βj, j = 0,1, ..., k for
any values of βj. The OLS estimator are unbiased estimators of the
population parameter.
Assumptions 1. - 5. are known as the Gauss-Markov assumptions for
cross-sectional analysis. Under these assumptions the OLS estimators
βˆj for βj is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). The Gauss-
Markov theorem says that for any linear and unbiased estimator, β˜j,
V ar(βˆj) ≤ V ar(β˜j), and the inequality is usually strict. This means
that in the class of linear unbiased estimators, OLS gives the small-
est variance under these five Gauss-Markov assumptions (Wooldridge,
2009).
Assumption 1. - 6. are called the classical linear model (CLM) as-
sumptions. When including the sixth assumption, the OLS estimators
have a stronger efficiency property than they would by only assuming
the Gauss-Markov assumptions. (Wooldridge, 2009). The assumption
of homoskedasticity is also crucial for the Gauss-Markov Theorem, if
this does not hold, the OLS is no longer BLUE.
Appendix D
Assumptions of the Binary Logistic
Model
1. The data Y1, Y2, ..., Yn are independently distributed
2. The distribution of Yi is Bin(ni, pii). The explained variable has
a binomial distribution
3. There is a linear relationship between the logit of the explained
variable and the explanatory variables
4. No strong multicollinearity. None of the independent variables
is constant in the sample. There are no exact linear relationship
between independent variables.
5. The errors need to be independent, but not normally distributed
6. The use of maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the pa-
rameters relies on large-sample approximation
Similar to the assumptions for the OLS method the explanatory vari-
ables need to be uncorrelated with the error terms. In other words,
there is no omitted control variables, the explanatory variables are
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measured without any errors and the explained variable does not af-
fect the explanatory variables.
The probability of having payment difficulties is assumed to be de-
pendent of the set of independent variables, and can be calculated by
the formula:
P (Paym. difficulties = 1) = e(b0+b1Cash-outit+γjxijt+γ2zlkt+δ1d04+δ2d07+δ3d12+eit)
1 + e(b0+b1Cash-outit+γ1xijt+γ2zlkt+δ1d04+δ2d07+δ3d12+eit)
Tufte, 2000.
Appendix E
Test of Assumptions
The variance inflation factor, VIF, is determined by the correlation
between xj the other explanatory variables.
V IFj = 1(1 −R2j) ,
Where R2j is the R
2 from regressing xj on all the other explanatory
variables, and including an intercept (Wooldridge, 2009).The VIF val-
ues for the key explanatory variables is listed in table E.1.
Table E.1: Variance Inflation Factor
VIF
Year 2001 2004 2007 2012
Explained variable
log(pred/hp) 6.75 5.71 4.95 5.25
duration of ownership 6.20 5.77 5.53 5.81
log(pred/hp)*duration of ownership 10.40 9.08 7.81 8.35
age 2.51 2.53 2.22 2.19
household size 6.42 5.84 4.85 4.88
children 5.34 5.33 4.54 4.40
nr. of working in household 2.28 2.04 1.74 1.93
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Values above 10 are a thumb rule for deciding when there is too much
multicollinearity. The VIF value of the interaction term is high in
each year, however this is not a big concern because it do not affect
the p-value.(ref) None of the VIF values in table E.1 exceed 10, and we
conclude that this is not a problem for our main regression (Midtbø,
2012).
Appendix F
Adjusted Wald Tests
Table F.1: Adjusted Wald Test of Income Quartiles
H0 F(df1, df2) Rejection of H0
β1.q1 = β2.q1 = β3.q1 = β4.q1 F(3,12007)=1,33 No
β1.q1 = β2.q1 = β3.q1 F(2,12008)=1,93 No
β2.q1 = β3.q1 = β4.q1 F(2,12008)=0,00 No
β1.q1 = β2.q1 F(1,12009)=3,40 Yes*
β1.q1 = β3.q1 F(1,12009)=3,22 Yes*
β1.q1 = β4.q1 F(1,12009)=2,55 No
1.q=income quartile 1, 2.q=income quartile 2, 3.q=income quartile 3
and 4.q=income quartile 4
Table F.2: Adjusted Wald Test of Age Cohorts
H0 F(df1, df2) Rejection of H0
β16−361 = β37−571 = β58−781 = β79−991 F(3,12007)=2,63 Yes**
β16−361 = β37−571 = β58−781 F(2,12008)=3,55 Yes**
β16−361 = β37−571 F(1,12009)=4,33 Yes**
β16−361 = β58−781 F(1,12009)=6,36 Yes**
β37−571 = β58−781 F(1,12009)=1,29 No
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Table F.3: Adjusted Wald Test for Groups of Duration of Ownership
H0 F(df1, df2) Rejection of H0
β0−41 = β5−91 = β10−141 = β15−191 = β20−291 = β30+1 F(5,12005)=5,09 Yes***
β0−41 = β5−91 = β10−141 = β15−191 = β20−291 F(4,12006)=4,22 Yes***
β0−41 = β5−91 = β10−141 = β15−191 F(3,12007)=3,75 Yes**
β0−41 = β5−91 = β10−141 F(2,12008)=2,46 Yes*
β0−41 = β5−91 F(1,12009)=2,20 No
β0−41 = β10−141 F(1,12009)=4,41 Yes**
β0−41 = β15−191 F(1,12009)=10,29 Yes***
β0−41 = β20−291 F(1,12009)=12,93 Yes***
β0−41 = β30+1 F(1,12009)=20,19 Yes***
